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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of language on economic performance. I
use the 1956 reorganization of Indian states on linguistic lines as a natural
experiment to estimate the impact of speaking the majority language on ed-
ucational and occupational outcomes. I find that districts that spoke the ma-
jority language of the state during colonial times enjoy persistent economic
benefits, as evidenced by higher educational achievement and employment in
communication intensive sectors. After reorganization, historically minority
language districts experience greater growth in educational achievement, in-
dicating that reassignment could reverse the impact of history.
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1 Introduction
Many differences in economic performance and human welfare can be traced to
variations in institutional characteristics of different regions. A large literature in
economics examines the impact of historically determined institutions on the tra-
jectory of economic welfare. Pioneered by North (1990), economists such as Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) have estab-
lished the role of colonial institutions on economic performance. Along with for-
mal institutions, social institutions such as caste, religion and kinship are perhaps
equally important in determining individual welfare in the modern era (Pande and
Udry 2006; Roy 2002). However, the role of colonial practices in shaping social
institutions remains an open research question. This paper examines the impact of
colonial and language-based post-colonial political organization on economic out-
comes and welfare in India.
Language is a social characteristic with near-universal importance in determin-
ing economic outcomes. Workers who are fluent in the dominant language of a
region receive higher returns in the labor market than workers who are not. As a re-
sult, for instance, immigrants expend substantial effort to learn the language of their
new home countries. In the United States and United Kingdom, new immigrants
enjoy higher incomes if they are fluent in English (Chiswick 1991; Dustmann and
Fabbri 2003). In parallel, one consequence of globalization is increasing returns to
and demand for learning English (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006).
The mid-century reorganization of states in India on linguistic lines offers an
opportunity to examine the impact of language on economic outcomes. Each state
consists of a number of administrative units called districts. If residents of a district
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speak, read and write the same language as a majority of the residents of the state,
they might experience better economic outcomes if they incur lower transaction
costs, leading to greater inter-district economic activity (Lang 1986).
A rich literature supports this premise. Lazear (1999) presents evidence from
the United States that individuals from small, minority communities are more likely
to adopt the language of the majority than individuals from larger minority groups,
presumably because the former have greater incentive to do so. Similarly, Carliner
(1981) documents wage differentials among Francophone and Anglophone men in
Quebec in 1971 when most of the economy was controlled by Anglophones. He re-
ports substantial rewards to English-speaking Francophones but no significant wage
premium for French-speaking Anglophones. In the rest of Canada, the wage differ-
ence between Anglophone and Francophone workers was smaller than in Quebec.
As a result, Francophone workers in Quebec responded by learning English, with
little response among Anglophones. As Francophones began to increasingly con-
trol Quebec’s economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the wage gap between Francophone
and Anglophone workers narrowed (Albouy 2008).
Similar evidence emerges from developing countries. Clingingsmith (2007) ar-
gues that economic growth in sectors where communication is relatively important
increases the incentive to learn new languages. Consequently, growth of the manu-
facturing sector increased bilingualism in mid-century India, especially among mi-
nority language speakers. The next generation spoke only the economically domi-
nant language, increasing linguistic homogeneity in the long run. Angrist and Lavy
(1997) demonstrate the economic impact of increasing transaction costs associated
with language. They report that when Morocco changed the language of instruction
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in schools from French to Arabic in 1983, the returns to post-secondary education
declined by one-half, primarily because most organized economic activity was con-
ducted in French.
In this paper, I examine the impact of speaking the dominant language on eco-
nomic performance in India using district level data on educational achievement
and occupational choice. India is a particularly appropriate setting for this study
since over 3,000 languages are used in the country, with 18 languages claiming
both wide speakership as well as constitutional recognition. Modern Indian states
correspond to the areas where these languages are in common use. Regulators, the
judiciary and other arms of the state government mandate use of official languages,
in addition to English, in their correspondence with citizens. Additionally, public
schools offer instruction using the medium of the state language, with some states
such as Gujarat and West Bengal doing so exclusively.1
Bivariate comparisons of communities that either speak or do not speak the
dominant language might not yield unbiased estimates because of potential endo-
geneity in community formation. Migrants may live in ethnic enclaves where they
do not need to learn the new language (Chiswick and Miller 2005a). Communities
that recognize the link between speaking a minority language and poorer economic
outcomes may try to form their own political units. For example, minorities in
developed countries such as Belgium, Spain and Canada and in developing coun-
tries such as Sri Lanka and Cameroon launched separatist movements based on
language.2 Thus, unbiased estimates require exogenous assignment of some com-
1Chakraborty and Kapur (2009) estimate the impact of introducing local language instruction on
labor market outcomes in the state of West Bengal.
2The economic impact of such movements in Spain and Sri Lanka are discussed in Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abeyratne (2004), respectively.
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munities to minority and majority languages.
To generate such estimates, I use the reorganization of Indian states in 1956
along strict linguistic lines as a natural experiment. Provincial boundaries in British
India were determined either by the sequence of British military conquest, with
provinces cobbled together as imperial rule extended from the coasts into the hin-
terland, or when the British decided to leave native rulers in place. Banerjee and
Iyer (2005) discuss the sequence of colonial conquest and argue that the process was
independent of linguistic concerns. In addition, the “Doctrine of Lapse” specified
that princely states where the ruler died without a natural-born male heir would cede
to direct colonial rule. Therefore, this policy determined the areas which would be
ruled directly by the British (Iyer 2010). Since both these factors were exogenous to
a district’s dominant language, so was the provincial organization of British India.3
In 1955, the States Reorganization Commission recommended the reorganiza-
tion of Indian states on strict linguistic lines, a principle which the central gov-
ernment followed while redrawing state boundaries in 1956, 1960, 1966 and 1971
(Govt. of India 1955). Table 1 shows the outcome of this principle. Despite half a
century of migration, communication and integration, major languages in modern
India are essentially spoken only in states formed by the districts that speak those
languages.4 Following from this, I classify each district as either a “majority” dis-
trict, if before reorganization, it belonged to a state where the district’s language
was the majority language of the state, or a “minority” district, if it belonged to a
state where the district’s language was the minority language. After reorganization,
new state boundaries encompassed those districts that shared a common language.
3Ban and Rao (2007) also use reorganization of Indian states as a source of exogenous variation.
4The major exception is Hindi/Urdu which is spoken all over Northern India.
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Thus, a natural experiment is set up in the opposite sequence of a typical random-
ized control trial. Before the reorganization, each district was classified as either
majority or minority by historical accident, and reassigned as majority after the re-
organization.5 The district-wise organization of the states in South India before and
after 1956 is shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
If native language (or “mother tongue”) instruction facilitates schooling, I ex-
pect to find that majority districts should achieve persistently better educational
outcomes compared to minority districts. If a common language decreases com-
munication costs, I expect relatively lower shares of employment in the agricultural
sector (where communication between workers is less important) compared to the
manufacturing and services sectors in the majority districts. Growth rates for each
of these measures should also be higher in minority districts after reorganization, as
these districts “catch-up” after integrating into co-linguistic states.
Using a district level panel dataset based on the Census of India, I find support
for the hypothesis that shared language within a state potentially lowers commu-
nication costs, increasing schooling and facilitating the switch to non-agricultural
professions. The analysis shows that colonial mis-assignment for minority districts
is associated with lower rates of educational achievement. The impact is greater on
primary and secondary schooling, which in most states is conducted in the vernacu-
lar, than on college education, where the medium of instruction is typically English.
In addition, the results show that workers in these districts are employed dispro-
portionately in agriculture rather than communication intensive industries such as
5In a classic randomized control trial, subjects are drawn from a mixed sample and assigned to
either a treatment or control group. In this case, districts were assigned to minority or majority status
by the British, and then placed in a pure sample of majority-only states by reorganization.
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commerce and transportation. The results are robust to a number of alternate spec-
ifications that use the linguistic distance and the degree of language polarization in
the population to indicate minority status. I also find evidence that reassigning a
minority district to the state where it is part of the linguistic majority can reverse
the impact of history. Minority districts experienced greater growth in educational
achievement after reorganization as they “caught up” with the previously majority
districts. Workers in these districts shifted away from agriculture towards com-
munication intensive industries such as manufacturing and transportation, although
this result is not significant. Finally, I calculate the impact of historical language
status on modern income differences between districts.
2 Historical Background
2.1 British Conquest of India, 1757-1857
In this section, I present the history of British conquest that determined the pre-1956
boundaries of Indian states. Direct and indirect British colonial rule in India lasted
190 years. British trading companies arrived in India in 1600, but historians date
the political conquest of the Indian subcontinent from 1757, when the East India
Company gained control over the province of Bengal in the Battle of Plassey. The
areas around Bengal, i.e., Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling and Orissa, were integrated to form
the Bengal Presidency with Calcutta as the capital.
In the next 90 years, the Company extended its control over the rest of India. It
obtained feudal control over the Southern coast from the Nawab of Carnatic where
it established the trading post of Fort St. George (later called Madras and now Chen-
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nai) in 1640. The geographically contiguous areas around Madras were acquired
and integrated into the Madras Presidency.6
The Company acquired seven islands from Portugal as part of Catherine de
Braganza’s dowry in her marriage to Charles II of England in 1661. The seven
islands became the East India Company headquarters in western India in 1668 and
renamed Bombay (now Mumbai). This and subsequent territorial acquisitions in
Western India, notably the Maratha territories obtained in 1817-18, were integrated
to form the Bombay Presidency.7 Similarly, the United Provinces were formed
around the districts that were acquired from the Nawab of Oudh in 1775, and the
province of Punjab was organized around the territories acquired after defeating
Ranjit Singh in 1848. The city of Delhi, which became the capital of the British
Empire in India in 1911, came under de facto British control after the Battle of
Delhi in 1803.
The rest of India, approximately 38% of the area, was administered indirectly
by the British through the agency of native kings and princes (Roy 1994). Major
examples were Kashmir in the North, Hyderabad in Central India and Mysore and
Travancore in South India. Iyer (2010) shows that determination of regions annexed
for direct rule, and regions administered by native rulers was not a function of the
economic or social characteristics of those places. Instead, a policy called “Doctrine
of Lapse” specified that a territory was annexed if the ruler died without a natural
male heir. Since the gender of a child is random, endogenous assignment into direct
or indirect colonial rule is not a significant concern.
6Northern Circars, 1765; districts ceded by Mysore, 1792 and 1800; Tanjore, 1799; districts
ceded by the Nawab of Carnatic, 1801.
7Surat, 1800; Gujarat, 1803 and 1818; Maratha territories, 1818; Satara, 1848.
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The East India Company’s administration ended after the mutiny of 1857 and
India was ruled directly as part of the British Empire. British India consisted of nine
major and six minor provinces, as well as a multitude of princely states. The major
provinces were the presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, the lieutenant-
governorships of Bihar, Burma, Orissa, Punjab and United Provinces, and the Chief
Commissionerships of Assam and Central Provinces. Chelmsford (1918) describes
the process of both conquest and organization of the administrative structure of
colonial India.
[T]he present map of British India was shaped by the military, political
or administrative exigencies or conveniences of the moment, and with
small regard to the natural affinities or wishes of the people.
This sentiment was echoed 12 years later by the Simon Commission (1930) which
was established to review the constitutional structure of British India
[there were in India] only a number of administrative areas [which had]
grown up almost haphazard as the result of conquest, supersession of
former rules or administrative convenience
The commission recommended reorganization of states to reflect a more coherent
administrative picture.
Although we are well aware of the difficulties encountered in all at-
tempts to alter boundaries and of the administrative and financial com-
plications that arise, we are making a definite recommendation for re-
viewing, and if possible resettling, the provincial boundaries of India
at as early a date as possible.
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Despite the Simon Commission’s recommendations, the colonial government
undertook no systematic reorganization of administrative units in India. British
rule in India ended in 1947, concurrent with the Partition of the Indian Empire into
India and Pakistan, which was formed from the Muslim-majority areas of Punjab,
Bengal and Bombay. The provincial boundaries of independent India in 1947 re-
flected geographical continuity in the pattern of British military conquest in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with little consideration towards the cultural or
social characteristics that united or divided the provinces.
2.2 Education Provision in Colonial India
Education in pre-British India followed indigenous systems without standardiza-
tion or significant state patronage, and was restricted to the social and economic
elites (Acharya 1978). As British officials focused on administration of conquered
territories in the eighteenth century, they introduced formal education both to train
potential employees for clerical positions as well as to create acceptance of West-
ern traditions and colonial rule (Evans 2002). A rich debate emerged on the lan-
guage of instruction in government-aided schools between the Orientalists, who
favored instruction in English, and the Vernaculars, who advocated instruction in
local languages. Inspired by Macaulay’s (1835) famous Minute on Indian Educa-
tion, Governor-General Lord William Bentick decided initially to use English as
the medium of instruction in mass education. However, instruction exclusively in
English proved expensive. Consequently, his successor, Lord Auckland, accepted
in 1839 Wood’s recommendations (outlined in his Dispatch, which Radhakrishnan
(1948) called the “Magna Carta of English Education in India”) that the govern-
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ment adopt vernacular languages for instruction in primary and secondary schools
and English for higher education (Windhausen 1964; Evans 2002).
Colonial officials at the province level, rather than central or local adminis-
trators, had significant influence on the development of schools, and educational
outcomes. Chaudhary (2010) reports that public financing was the backbone of
the school system, accounting for nearly half the expenditures during colonial rule.
This increased to 60% by 1947, with the rest from annual school fees levied on
students.8 With these funds, the Bombay Presidency constructed a large network
of public schools whereas Bengal, Bihar and Orissa relied on private schools that
were incorporated into the state system.
As a result of colonial educational investments, 93% of schools in 1931 were
either public schools or privately managed schools receiving public funds. Total
enrollment, which was 10% in 1891, increased to 30% in 1931 (Chaudhary 2010).
Crude literacy rates in 1931 ranged from 17.4% in Madras Presidency to 8.9% in
Bihar and Orissa. Educational achievement primarily reflected facility with ver-
nacular languages, with only 14.3% of all literates also able to read and write in
English. Within this, the dominant language was the majority vernacular of the
province. For example, Mohanty (2002) reports that the entire Orissa division of
Bengal had only seven Oriya schoolteachers. The majority of teachers were Ben-
galis, and Bengali language textbooks were used for instruction.
At the post-secondary level, the British established universities in Calcutta,
Bombay and Madras starting from 1857 (Radhakrishnan 1948). Annamalai (2004)
reports that unlike primary and secondary schools, these universities employed a
8In regions that experienced indirect colonial rule (native states), education policy was deter-
mined by local rulers (Chaudhary 2010).
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number of British faculty members, and the medium of instruction was English.
Growing demand for higher and professional education led to the establishment of
the University of Allahabad in 1887, as well as 21 other universities in the twenti-
eth century. With the exception of Osmania University in Hyderabad where under-
graduate classes were taught in Urdu, the medium of instruction remained English
(Radhakrishnan 1948).
2.3 Reorganization of Indian States, 1956-1971
The nationalist leadership in India before Independence recognized the value of
reorganization of states. The Indian National Congress, the main nationalist party,
organized its regional committees on the basis of language in 1921 and endorsed the
principle of the linguistic provinces (Arora 1956). However, India’s Independence
was accompanied by Partition on religious lines, which dampened enthusiasm for
further division on an ethnic or cultural basis and the national leadership showed
no interest in pursuing this reorganization (Guha 2008). The first Home Minister,
Vallabhbhai Patel wrote (Dar 1948)
[T]he first and last need of India at the present moment is that it should
be made a nation . . . Everything which helps the growth of nationalism
has to go forward and everything which throws obstacles in its way
has to be rejected or should stand over. We have applied this test to
linguistic provinces also, and judged by this test, on our opinion [they]
cannot be supported.
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Nonetheless, many regional movements advocated the idea of linguistic auton-
omy, particularly in the southern states. In 1952, following the death of an ac-
tivist protesting for a separate state for Telugu speakers, the central government
announced the formation of Andhra Pradesh from the Telugu speaking districts of
Madras Province as well as a States Reorganization Commission (Govt. of India
1955). This commission recommended redrawing state boundaries entirely on lin-
guistic principles, explicitly recognizing the role of shared language in reducing
transaction costs (“Indian states, if linguistically constituted, will be able to achieve
internal cohesiveness because language is a vehicle for communion of thoughts”),
especially through education in vernacular schools (“educational activity can be
stimulated by giving regional languages their due place”), leading to increasing ad-
ministrative links within the state (“linguistic homogeneity as an important factor
conducive to administrative convenience and efficiency”). South India was reorga-
nized in 1956, West India in 1960 and the rest of India in 1965 and 1970.
Table 2 lists the states that were formed as a result of the Commission’s recom-
mendation from 1956 through 1971. Table 3 shows the impact of the reorganization,
comparing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a measure of concentration, for
the share of different languages for the 1911 provinces and princely states with the
“successor” states in 2001.9 The table reveals that despite 90 years of population
mixing, reorganization yielded states that were systematically more concentrated in
spoken languages than the predecessor states.10
9HHI =
N∑
i=1
s2i where si is the percent share of language i in the state. HHI = 10, 000 indicates
that a single language is used in the state and therefore a high degree of concentration.
10The major exception is Bengal, which was partitioned into West Bengal and the more populous
Bangladesh. Since Hindi speakers were concentrated in the West before Independence, the successor
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3 Data Description
Estimating the impact of language requires district level data on demographic and
economic characteristics before and after 1956. The data should contain variables
that represent the outcomes of interest, as well as a rich set of covariates represent-
ing factors that might impact performance. Also critical is that each district in the
data should be classified as part of the linguistic minority or majority in its state
before the mid-century reorganization.
The primary source of data that meets the above requirements is the decadal
Census of India conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government
of India. I use the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 waves of the Census. Data
at the district level from the last four waves is compiled into a panel by Barnes
and Vanneman (2000). This version of the Census contains data on population
characteristics such as literacy, educational achievement and source of livelihood.
Each variable is reported separately for all persons, men, rural residents and rural
male residents in the district. In addition, the 1981 and 1991 Census contain data
on the number of schools and colleges at the district level.
The Barnes and Vanneman (2000) dataset is augmented with data on mother
tongue, education, religious and caste composition, and occupational choice from
the 1951 Census of India. This allows us to measure the baseline rates of education
and occupational choice before 1956, and estimate the difference in outcomes as a
result of the change. The sources of this data are the economic tables, and the dis-
trict census handbooks. While the economic tables report population size variables
for all 321 districts in 1951, the district census handbooks report a more detailed set
state has a more diverse set of languages.
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of variables, including data on educational achievement and occupational choice,
for 140 districts. I am not concerned about selective data reporting since the re-
maining handbooks were destroyed by humidity and pests, and these factors are
unlikely to be correlated with economic outcomes in 1951.
I add a number of district-level geographic controls that might impact economic
performance since India is primarily an agricultural economy. The Indian Mete-
orological Department provides monthly rainfall and temperature readings at the
sub-division level.11 I calculate the mean and variance of the January and July mea-
sures for each census decade and include these in the dataset. In addition, the World
Bank’s India Agriculture and Climate Data Set reports the latitude, longitude, ele-
vation and soil type for each district.
I restrict the study to states of South India for three reasons. First, the first wave
of reorganization in 1956 took place in South India only. A potential concern with
subsequent waves of reorganization (listed in Table 2) is that states bargained over
districts and therefore the natural experiment is not as clean. For example, Guha
(2008) recounts considerable political bargaining between the states of Maharashtra
and Gujarat over the city of Bombay. Second, Kumar and Somanathan (2009) docu-
ment changes in district boundaries across many of the Census waves in my dataset.
Most of these changes were in North India, whereas the district boundaries in South
India have remained stable over time. Although they offer a method to correct for
population totals, there is no way to correct for other variables such as educational
achievement or occupational choice in districts outside South India. Third, the mod-
ern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu exhibit significant
11Each district is matched to a sub-division.
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diversity in languages unlike North India where Hindi is widespread, allowing for
cleaner identification of the effects of language on economic outcomes.
With this restriction, the dataset yields 370 district-year observations. Table 4
summarizes some of the variables of interest. Minority districts are 23 out of 67
districts. Scheduled Castes represent 14.3% of the population. The cumulative lit-
eracy rate over the decades was 37.2%, with the literacy rate for men approximately
double than for women. As expected, completion rates decline for higher education
levels, with only 1.2% of the population reporting a college degree. The census
reported an occupation for 52% of the population, with the majority (30%) directly
engaged in agriculture and 4.1% in communications intensive industries such as
commerce and transportation.
4 Empirical Analysis
The objective of the empirical exercise is to estimate the impact of language on
economic outcomes. A district’s language identifies it as either a “majority” or a
“minority” district. The language used by the majority of residents within a district
is relatively stable over time. Conversely, state boundaries changed as a result of the
reorganization exercise. Thus, a minority district was in the linguistic minority of
the state before reorganization, and reassigned to a state formed on the basis of its
language after reorganization. In a majority district, the primary language was the
state’s majority language both before and after reorganization. Since the classifica-
tion of a district depends on the exogenous province-formation by the British, and
subsequent allocation to states is on strict linguistic lines, the difference in outcomes
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between minority and majority districts identifies the impact of language ability on
economic outcomes.
In the empirical tests presented in Section 4.1, I therefore use two types of
outcomes that are strongly correlated with household and per capita income. The
first type of outcomes is educational achievement, which includes literacy and pri-
mary school, high school and college completion rates as these are likely to be
directly impacted by the language used for instruction. High rates of educational
achievement are in turn linked to greater economic growth. For example, using
cross-country panel data, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) find that human capital,
represented by the level of education, has a positive and significant impact on total
factor productivity. In a country-specific study using school enrollment and fac-
tory employment data from nineteenth century Prussian districts, Becker, Hornung,
and Woessmann (2011) found that higher initial levels of education were associ-
ated with significantly higher levels of technological adoption, leading to greater
economic development during the Industrial Revolution. In an industry-specific
study using state level data from India, Arora and Bagde (2010) find that greater
investment in educational infrastructure, especially private engineering colleges, is
strongly correlated with the volume of software exports.
The second type of outcomes are employment variables. Lower communication
costs might induce a shift in occupational choice away from agriculture, where ar-
guably communication between workers does not play a major role, and towards
sectors such as manufacturing, commerce and transportation, where communica-
tion between workers is important for productivity. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1991) present a model, with complementary empirical evidence, where employ-
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ment in a sector depends on the returns to ability and to scale in each sector. Thus,
I expect greater employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors, which have ex-
perienced significantly greater growth in post-Independence India compared to em-
ployment in the agricultural sector.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) also develop a model where countries above a
threshold level of human capital are able to “catch-up” with technologically ad-
vanced countries once they are able to access the technology as well. If language
is viewed as a “social technology”, then districts should experience catch-up eco-
nomic growth once they are reassigned to states where they are part of the linguistic
majority. In Section 4.2, I therefore test whether minority districts catch-up in edu-
cational achievement and shift to occupations in the secondary and tertiary sectors
after reorganization by estimating differences-in-differences in outcomes before and
after reorganization.
4.1 Do minority districts have persistently poorer outcomes?
In this section, I estimate whether districts with historical minority language status
have persistently poorer economic outcomes. In addition to a test of differences
between minority and majority districts, I conduct three robustness checks. First,
I estimate the first differences model restricting my sample to the set of districts
at the border of states, where I expect stronger results since I exclude districts that
are far from the state borders. Second, I expect that increasing the exogenously
determined linguistic distance between the district’s language and state’s official
language will lead to relatively poorer economic outcomes. Third, I expect that a
more polarized district, where the fraction of minority language speakers is large,
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will have relatively poorer outcomes compared to a district where the number of
speakers of each language is evenly matched.
4.1.1 Test using minority status
The first specification tests for the difference in outcomes between minority and
majority districts. The key identifying assumption in this model is that the initial
assignment of districts as minority or majority districts is not correlated with out-
comes. In section 2.1 I argue that this is indeed the case and therefore specify the
following first differences model.
yit = β0 + β1minorityi + β2Zi + β3Xit + Dt + it (1)
The variable yit represents outcomes where I expect systematic differences between
minority and majority districts. The coefficient of interest is β1, which represents
the marginal impact of a district that was in the linguistic minority before the re-
organization of states. minorityi is an indicator variable that is 1 if district i was
reassigned from one state to another in the reorganization of 1956 and 0 otherwise.
I cannot introduce district fixed effects because minorityi is constant over time.
Hence, I introduce Zi, which is a vector of observed district characteristics, mainly
geographical variables, that are invariant over time and potentially impact yit. I also
include Xit as a vector of observed district-level time varying characteristics such
as the average and variance in January and July rainfall over the decade and the
fraction of residents who are from historically disadvantaged Scheduled Caste (SC)
backgrounds. Finally, I include decade fixed effects (Dt) to account for all observed
and unobserved decade characteristics that impact outcomes for all districts, as well
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as an i.i.d. normal error term (it) to represent unobserved time and district varying
characteristics.
First, I measure differences in educational achievement rates. I expect that ma-
jority language districts will have higher rates of literacy, middle school completion
and matriculation rates, i.e., β1 < 0 for these outcomes. While the qualitative im-
pact on graduation rates predicted by the theory are the same, the coefficients for
these outcomes might be smaller since English rather than the local language is
commonly used as the medium of instruction at higher levels, mitigating the impact
of historical differences in local language use. I expect that minority districts have
a larger fraction of workers who are cultivators and agricultural laborers (β1 > 0),
and a smaller fraction who are employed in the non-farm sector (β1 < 0). Within
the non-farm sector, I expect stronger results for workers in the commerce and
transportation sectors which might benefit disproportionately from ease of commu-
nication.12
Table 5 presents estimates for the OLS coefficient on minority district status (β1)
based on equation 1. In this table, the coefficients for literacy rates are positive and
statistically significant. The literacy rate is 24.0% lower for minority districts and
27.4% lower in the rural areas of the same districts. Middle school completion and
matriculation rates are similarly lower. Although college graduation rates are also
lower in minority districts, the coefficient (-19.3%) is different from the school level
results. One explanation for the negative coefficient is that the supply of students for
colleges is lower in minority districts since fewer complete high school. However,
the coefficient for college graduation is smaller than for school completion since
12Specifically, I take the log fraction of the population that is employed in each sector.
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the medium of instruction in college is English, and therefore impacted less by a
district’s minority status.
Table 6 shows that a district’s minority status has a negligent impact on employ-
ment in the agricultural sector. The fraction of cultivators is lower by 0.9%, but the
fraction of agricultural laborers is higher by 10.6%. Both coefficients are statisti-
cally insignificant at the 10% level. As expected, Table 6 also reports that minority
districts have a significantly lower rates of non-farm sector employment (-12.8%
for all workers). The magnitude of the β1 coefficient is -16.6% for commercial
sector employment and -32.9% for transport sector employment, suggesting that
the impact of minority status is stronger in sectors where the influence of language
is potentially larger. The magnitude of the coefficients is smaller for rural areas
perhaps because the commercial and transport sectors are not as large as in urban
regions.
One concern with these results is that they are driven by variables omitted from
the specification. To address this concern, I follow the strategy presented in Baner-
jee and Iyer (2005) and consider the subset of minority and majority districts that
share a geographical border. Table 7 shows that minority districts report even worse
education achievement rates (-27.4% for literacy, -43.4% for middle school comple-
tion, -32.3% for matriculation and -30.9% lower for graduation) when considering
bordering districts only. The results for occupational choice show that minority dis-
tricts have a greater share of the workforce in the agricultural sector. The fraction of
cultivators is 21.1% higher, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Simul-
taneously, the fraction of the non-farm workforce declines by 23.4%, with a large
difference of 31.1% for workers in the transportation sector.
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Thus, the test of first differences between minority and majority language dis-
tricts presents evidence that historical mis-assignment has persistent impact on
modern educational achievement and occupation outcomes. The additional test us-
ing a restricted sample of border districts only suggests that omitted variables do not
drive this result, and that the language status of the district directly affects economic
outcomes.
4.1.2 Test using linguistic distance measure
A potential concern with the interpretation of the results represented in the previous
section is that they may represent systematic cultural differences between minority
and majority districts, instead of linguistic differences by district. To address this
concern, I propose a test using a measure of linguistic distance that is logically
orthogonal to economic outcomes. This measure, developed by Lewis (2009), is
constructed by counting the number of nodes between each pair of languages on the
family tree of Indo-European and Dravidian languages.13 More nodes imply that it
is more difficult for a speaker of one language to learn another language and vice
versa, and translates into a higher score for linguistic distance. For example, Punjabi
and Hindi are adjacent to each other on the family tree, and therefore the linguistic
distance between the two is 1. On the other hand, Tamil speakers find it difficult
to understand or learn Hindi and vice versa, which is represented by a linguistic
distance of 13 on my measure. Table 8 reports the linguistic distance between each
pair of Scheduled Indian languages, where the average pairwise distance between
13Chiswick and Miller (2005b) and Beenstock, Chiswick, and Repetto (2001) also develop and
use measures of linguistic distance. They report the pairwise distance between major international
languages and distance between Hebrew and other languages spoken by migrants to Israel, respec-
tively.
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the four South Indian languages is 5.8. 14
Using the data from Table 8, I assign a linguistic distance measure to each mi-
nority district based on the pair of languages dominant in the states that the district
was assigned to before and after reorganization. I specify the following model
where the linguistic distance Li is interacted with the minorityi dummy in equation
1.15
yit = β0 + β1minorityi + β2minorityi ∗ Li + β3Zi + β4Xit + Dt + it (2)
In this specification, β2 estimates the marginal impact of a unit increase in lin-
guistic distance on outcomes in a minority district. I expect that β2 is negative and
statistically significant for economic measures such as educational achievement and
participation in non-farm employment.
Table 9 presents OLS estimates of β2 using the same set of educational and occu-
pational choice outcomes as the previous section . I find strong confirmation for the
theoretical prediction that minority language districts have lower economic oppor-
tunity, and that outcomes are poorer with increase in linguistic distance between the
district’s main language and state’s majority language. Table 9 reports large differ-
ences between minority and majority districts for primary and secondary schooling
14Shastry (2010) reports that this measure is strongly correlated with two alternative and logically
independent measures of linguistic distance. The first, developed by Shastry (2010) in collaboration
with Professor Jay Jasanoff of Harvard University, measures distance based on shared cognates,
distance and syntax. The second, based on the Comparative Indo-European Database developed by
Dyen, Kruskal, and Black (1997) measures distance as the fraction of words from one language that
are cognates of words from the second language. I cannot use the Shastry/Jasanoff measure since it
reports the distance only between Hindi and other languages and not for every pairwise combination
of languages, nor the Dyen, Kruskal, and Black (1997) measure since it does not include Dravidian
languages.
15Note that equation (2) does not contain a separate levels term for linguistic distance since the
variable is relevant only for minority language districts.
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(-6.9% and -7.0%, respectively) which are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The matriculation and graduation rates are also lower in minority districts, by 3.9%
and 3.8% respectively, but the associated standard errors are large and the point
estimates cannot be statistically distinguished from the null. However, the larger
and more precisely estimated impact of linguistic distance on primary and middle
school education compared to higher education supports the hypothesis that lan-
guage manifests itself early in the education process when local language teaching
is more important.
4.1.3 Test using minority fraction measure
A potential concern with the minority variable as defined and used in previous sec-
tions is that it does not capture the intra-district mix of languages used. In order to
address this concern, I propose an alternative, continuous measure of minority sta-
tus, MinorityFraction, that helps differentiate polarized districts where the state’s
minority language is spoken by a large fraction of residents from those districts
where the number of minority and majority language speakers are evenly matched.
An important identifying assumption is that potential economic outcomes do not
influence where the speakers of different languages reside. This assumption is jus-
tified because native tongue is determined historically, and inter-district migration
in India is very low with no discernable economic impact (Munshi and Rosenzweig
2009).
MinorityFraction =
OtherLang − S tateLang
OtherLang + S tateLang
(3)
In this definition, StateLang represents the number of speakers of the official
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language of the state where the district is located. OtherLang is the number of
speakers of the most popular language spoken in the district other than the state’s
language. Hence, for minority districts, OtherLang > S tateLang and MinorityFraction >
0, and vice versa. Additionally, a large positive value for MinorityFraction indicates
that a large fraction of the population speaks the minority language compared to the
state language whereas a small positive value implies that the two languages are
spoken by relatively same number of district residents.
The 1951 Census reports the top three languages spoken in each district. From
this data, I calculate MinorityFraction for each district and replace minority with
this new variable in equations (1) and (2).
yit = β0 + β1MinorityFractioni + β2Zi + β3Xit + Dt + it (4)
In equation (4), β1 indicates the marginal impact of increasing the share of mi-
nority language speakers on outcome variable yit. Table 10 shows that districts with
large minority language populations suffer from greater shortfalls in educational at-
tainment. The coefficients on literacy, middle school completion and matriculation
are -9.4%, -14.4% and -12.3%, respectively, all of which are statistically different
from the null. However, as expected, the impact on college graduation is impre-
cisely estimated though the point estimate is negative. Concurrently, the fraction of
workers in commerce and transportation are also lower (-7.8% and -18.7% and sta-
tistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively). Although the coefficient
of cultivation as an occupational choice is negative (-7.4%), the associated standard
errors are large.
The results in this section show that more polarized districts in 1951, where
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a smaller fraction spoke the dominant language of the province where the district
was located, experienced significantly poorer educational outcomes in the post-
Independence period, with lower employment in communication intensive sectors
such as commerce and transportation.
4.2 Do minority districts catch up after reorganization?
In this section, I exploit the panel structure of the dataset and the timing of the 1956
reorganization to test for the catch-up hypothesis among minority districts after
reassignment using a differences-in-differences framework. The sample used in the
test is restricted to those districts for which 1951 census data is available. However,
as explained in section 3, this is unlikely to cause selection bias.
yit = β0 + β1minorityi + β2Postt + β3minorityi ∗ Postt + β4Xit + β5Zi + Dt + it (5)
In this specification, yit represents an educational or occupational outcome in
census waves from 1951 to 1991. Hence, the coefficient β3 represents the marginal
impact of the 1956 reassignment on minority language districts. The key identi-
fying assumption is that in the absence of the reorganization, there would be no
systematic differences in the trend of yit between minority and majority districts. I
expect greater change in outcomes (as before, increased enrollment in formal edu-
cation and shift from agriculture to secondary sector occupations) among minority
language districts.
Table 11 shows that reassignment had a large and significant impact (+20.9%
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and statistically significant at the 10% level) on basic literacy levels. Even more
striking is the impact on middle school completion (+71.6% and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level) and matriculation rates (+67.6% and statistically significant
at the 1% level) in minority districts. Although college graduation also increased
dramatically, the coefficient (+45.9%) cannot be statistically distinguished from the
null.
The results for occupational choice do not follow on expected lines. Employ-
ment increased in the agricultural sector (the fraction of cultivators increased by
21.0% and agricultural laborers by 26.7%) but decreased in the non-farm sector (-
14.9%). However, all these coefficients are statistically insignificant and cannot be
distinguished from the null. One potential explanation for this result is that educa-
tional and occupational shifts occur sequentially. Change in language policy affects
educational achievement relatively quickly and cheaply since schools only need to
change the medium of instruction. However, occupational shift requires workers to
finish school and college under the new policy, and only subsequently choose em-
ployment in various industries. At the same time, occupational shift also requires
creation of new firms in the secondary sector, which was a slow process in India’s
heavily regulated post-Independence economy.
4.3 Impact of language on income
Finally, I estimate the impact of linguistic differences on income in minority versus
majority districts. Estimates of district level per capita income from the National
Sample Survey are difficult to use, since it is not representative at the district level.
Instead, I use district-level estimates for GDP in 2001 from the Indicus Analytics
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that are computed by aggregating the volume of production in primary, secondary
and tertiary sectors, and multiplied by prevailing prices (Indicus Analytics 2011).
I cannot estimate a fully-specified model of the determinants of income differ-
ences since the dataset lacks a reasonably complete set of covariates that determine
GDP at the district level.16 Instead, I take a parsimonious approach and present the
differences in income levels between minority and majority districts in Table 12.
This table shows that, consistent with greater educational achievement and work-
force participation in the secondary and tertiary sectors, majority districts also have
higher per capita and per worker income in these sectors. Overall per capita GDP
is Rs. 2290 per year higher in majority districts, whereas annual per worker income
is Rs. 3870 higher in majority districts. These higher incomes for majority districts
are driven by greater secondary and tertiary sector GDP. For majority districts, per
capita GDP is Rs. 440 higher in the secondary sector and Rs. 1670 higher in the
tertiary sector, but Rs. 130 lower in the primary sector.
Differences in per worker income are similarly driven by the secondary and
tertiary sector. Table 12 reveals that for majority districts, per worker GDP is Rs.
9500 higher in the secondary sector and Rs. 4460 in the tertiary sector, but only
Rs. 620 higher in the primary sector. These calculations suggest that the impact of
language on economic outcomes is persistent, not only in terms of education and
employment, but also income.
16Estimating equation 1 with district per capita GDP as a dependent variable reveals that this
model has very low explanatory power (R2 < 0.01), suggesting significant omitted variable bias and
a misspecified model.
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5 Discussion
The historian Ramachandra Guha has argued that the reorganization of Indian states
was a transformative event in the life of a young republic (Guha 2008). It recog-
nized and accommodated the development of a wide array of languages and asso-
ciated cultural traditions while maintaining a federal and democratic polity. This
paper explains how language-based reorganization of state boundaries, which ex-
ogenously changed the state language for some districts, had an impact on economic
outcomes within those districts.
To explain the impact of language-based reorganization on economic outcomes,
I argued that sharing the same language might reduce communication costs, boost-
ing the incentive for education and the economic returns to labor in the communications-
intensive secondary sector. In the long run, this may lead to greater trade, produc-
tivity and social welfare. I found evidence in support of this mechanism as districts
that shifted from states where they were in the linguistic minority to states where
they were part of the majority experienced greater educational achievement and an
employment shift from agriculture to manufacturing, communications and trade.
The effects were largest for primary schooling, as well as for those sectors, such
as transportation, that were most likely to be impacted by language. Section 4.2
offered evidence that reassigning a minority district into a state formed on the basis
of shared language can reverse the impact of history, and the district can experience
disproportionate growth in educational achievement. Finally, section 4.3 compared
2001 per capita and per worker GDP between minority and majority districts, and
confirmed that higher education and occupational shift to the secondary and tertiary
sectors in majority districts led to higher incomes in those sectors, with stagnant or
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lower income in the primary sector.
These results should be read with a number of caveats. First, the analysis ex-
cludes an investigation of gravity effects by focusing on districts that border states.
Second, this paper does not account for bilingualism, multilinguilism and language
shift, especially with increasing use of English in the last century.
Nonetheless, this paper has implications on new state formation in India. After
1971, a number of Union Territories (areas administered by the central government)
converted to formal statehood. More significantly, three new states – Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand and Uttaranchal – were carved out in 2000 from larger states on the basis
of distinct culture of these regions. A number of proposals for separate statehood
backed by popular movements remain in active consideration, most notably for a
separate Telangana state separated from Andhra Pradesh. The results presented
in this paper indicate that language through its impact on commercial growth is
a significant driver of economic performance in new states. Therefore, new states
formed on the basis of shared economic infrastructure are likely to experience better
outcomes.
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Appendices
A Endogeneity in migration
A possible concern with the district-level, rather than individual-level, analysis pre-
sented in previous sections is that language can possibly generate differences in
economic outcomes through the channel of inter-district migration. This would
bias my estimates if productive individuals in minority districts migrate to majority
districts, enroll in schools and higher education and work disproportionately in the
non-farm sector.
I address this concern in two ways. First, the empirical literature which relies on
district-level analysis in India does not find significant inter-district migration. For
example, using data from the National Sample Survey, Duflo and Pande (2007) find
that their results are robust to potentially endogenous inter-district migration. Sec-
ond, I estimate the impact of linguistic differences on rates of migration using the
same specifications presented in Section 4.1, and total migration and rural male mi-
grants from the district as dependent variables. Table 13 shows that the coefficients
for the minority variable are all small and statistically insignificant. This suggests
that districts’ historical linguistic status did not have much impact on migration and
inter-district migration is unlikely to bias the results presented in the main text.
35
Figure 1: District assignments in South India before 1956
Figure 2: District assignments in South India after 1956
Map source: www.wikipedia.org
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Table 1: State-wise concentration of languages
Fraction of all speakers
Language Main States who reside in the state
Scheduled Languages that form basis of state
Assamese Assam 98.8%
Bengali West Bengal 82.0%
Gujarati Gujarat 92.8%
Hindi Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Haryana, 90.2%
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh
Kannada Karnataka 91.9%
Kashmiri Jammu and Kashmir 98.2%
Malayalam Kerala 93.2%
Manipuri Manipur 86.3%
Marathi Maharashtra 92.6%
Oriya Orissa 92.6%
Punjabi Punjab 77.6%
Tamil Tamil Nadu 91.8%
Telugu Andhra Pradesh 86.4%
Scheduled Languages that do not form basis of a state
Bodo Assam 96.0%
Dogri Jammu and Kashmir 96.6%
Konkani Goa, Maharashtra, Karnataka 88.2%
Maithili Bihar 97.1%
Nepali Assam, West Bengal, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh 76.3%
Santali Jharkhand, West Bengal 79.2%
Sindhi Gujarat, Rajasthan 65.8%
Urdu Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, 81.0%
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka
Note: Scheduled languages are major Indian languages listed in the Eighth schedule of the Consti-
tution. Source: Census of India, 2001.
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Table 2: New states in India, 1956-71
Year
State established Legislation
Karnataka, Kerala, Lakshadweep, 1956 States Reorganisation Act, 1956
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat, Maharashtra 1960 Bombay Reorganization Act, 1960
Nagaland 1963 State ofNagaland Act, 1962
Haryana 1966 Haryana Act, 1966
Himachal Pradesh 1971 State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1971
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Total Population 370 2072956 1090839
Fraction of Scheduled Castes 292 14.30% 0.053
Education
Literacy rate 294 37.20% 0.181
Middle school completion rate 226 14.60% 0.103
Matriculation rate 293 6.04% 0.053
College graduation rate 226 1.16% 0.012
Occupation
Cultivators 319 18.58% 0.156
Agricultural laborers 319 11.87% 0.056
Non-farm workforce 319 17.80% 0.107
Commercial workers 319 3.08% 0.020
Transportation workers 319 1.05% 0.009
Source: Census of India (1951) and Indian District Panel Dataset (1961-1991).
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Table 5: Result for education in minority versus majority districts
Dependent Variable OLS Coefficient (β1) N adj. R2
Total literacy rate -0.240*** 172 0.566
(0.051)
Rural literacy rate -0.274*** 172 0.580
(0.055)
Middle school completion rate -0.249*** 129 0.533
(0.074)
Rural middle school completion rate -0.305*** 129 0.548
(0.081)
Matriculation rate -0.239*** 172 0.792
(0.078)
Rural matriculation rate -0.291*** 172 0.860
(0.074)
College graduation rate -0.193* 129 0.717
(0.104)
Rural college graduation rate -0.258*** 129 0.841
(0.086)
Notes: The reported OLS coefficients correspond to β1 from equation (1). Regression includes
decade fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Data
sources: Census of India (1951-1991), Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India
Agriculture and Climate Data Set.
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Table 6: Result for occupation in minority versus majority districts
Dependent Variable OLS Coefficient (β1) N adj. R2
Total cultivators -0.009 172 0.219
(0.085)
Total agricultural laborers 0.106 172 0.254
(0.082)
Rural agricultural laborers 0.099 172 0.346
(0.071)
Total non-farm workforce -0.128** 172 0.142
(0.059)
Rural non-farm workforce -0.091 172 0.172
(0.072)
Total commercial workers -0.166*** 172 0.284
(0.048)
Rural commercial workers -0.083** 172 0.468
(0.040)
Total transportation workers -0.329*** 172 0.368
(0.087)
Rural transportation workers -0.306*** 172 0.560
Notes: The reported OLS coefficients correspond to β1 from equation (1). Regression includes
decade fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Data
sources: Census of India (1951-1991), Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India
Agriculture and Climate Data Set.
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Table 7: Result for minority versus majority districts (Bordering districts only)
Dependent Variable Coefficient (β1) N adj. R2
Literacy rate -0.274*** 141 0.797
(0.063)
Middle school completion rate -0.434*** 109 0.890
(0.116)
Matriculation rate -0.323*** 140 0.884
(0.106)
College graduation rate -0.309** 109 0.880
(0.142)
Cultivators 0.211** 141 0.589
(0.106)
Agricultural laborers 0.089 141 0.343
(0.108)
Non-farm workforce -0.234*** 141 0.602
(0.070)
Commercial workers -0.200*** 141 0.637
(0.063)
Transportation workers -0.311*** 141 0.436
(0.110)
Notes: The reported OLS coefficients correspond to β1 from equation (1). Regression includes state
and decade fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Data
sources: Census of India 1951-1991, Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India
Agriculture and Climate Data Set.
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Table 9: Results for education and occupational outcomes by linguistic distance
Dependent Variable OLS Coefficient (β2) N adj. R2
Literacy rate -0.069*** 172 0.614
(0.015)
Middle school completion rate -0.070*** 129 0.566
(0.015)
Matriculation rate -0.039 172 0.794
(0.024)
College graduation rate -0.038 129 0.718
(0.032)
Cultivators 0.113*** 172 0.304
(0.025)
Agricultural laborers 0.008 172 0.250
(0.0254)
Non-farm workforce 0.026 172 0.147
(0.018)
Commercial workers -0.000 172 0.280
(0.015)
Transportation workers -0.015 172 0.366
(0.027)
Notes: The reported coefficients correspond to β2 from equation (2). Regression includes decade
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Data sources:
Census of India 1951-1991. Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India Agriculture
and Climate Data Set.
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Table 10: Result for education and occupational choice outcomes usingMinor-
ityFraction
Dependent Variable Coefficient (β1) N R2
Literacy rate -0.094*** 194 0.693
(0.033)
Middle school completion rate -0.144*** 150 0.872
(0.054)
Matriculation rate -0.123** 193 0.855
(0.052)
College graduation rate -0.097 150 0.855
(0.070)
Cultivators -0.074 194 0.540
(0.049)
Agricultural laborers -0.021 194 0.226
(0.049)
Non-farm workforce 0.001 194 0.478
(0.036)
Commercial workers -0.078** 194 0.565
(0.030)
Transportation workers -0.187*** 194 0.348
(0.054)
Notes: The reported coefficients correspond to β1 in equation (4). Regression includes decade fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Data sources:
Census of India 1951-1991. Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India Agriculture
and Climate Data Set.
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Table 11: Result for education and occupational outcomes before and after
reorganization
‘
Dependent Variable OLS Coefficient (β3) N adj. R2
‘
Literacy rate 0.209* 194 0.797
‘ (0.124)
Middle school completion rate 0.716*** 150 0.898
(0.224)
Matriculation rate 0.676*** 193 0.871
(0.231)
College graduation rate 0.459 150 0.862
(0.314)
‘
Cultivators 0.021 194 0.579
(0.216)
Agricultural laborers 0.267 194 0.268
(0.220)
Non-farm workforce -0.149 194 0.529
(0.156)
Commercial workers -0.033 194 0.593
(0.133)
Transportation workers -0.019 194 0.351
(0.247)
Notes: The reported coefficients correspond to β3 in equation (5). Regression includes decade fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Data sources:
Census of India 1951-1991. Indian Meteorological Department, and World Bank India Agriculture
and Climate Data Set.
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Table 12: Differences in income between minority and majority districts
Dependent Variable Majority Minority Difference
Total per capita GDP 22.45 20.16 2.29
Primary sector per capita GDP 5.91 6.03 -0.13
Secondary sector per capita GDP 4.92 4.48 0.44
Tertiary sector per capita GDP 11.78 10.11 1.67*
Total per worker GDP 58.42 54.55 3.87
Primary sector per worker GDP 32.94 32.32 0.62
Secondary sector per worker GDP 71.26 61.76 9.50
Tertiary sector per worker GDP 100.13 95.66 4.46
Notes: Per capita and per worker GDP in Rs. ’000. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Data
sources: Indicus Analytics dataset on district GDP of India, 2001-02.
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Table 13: Inter-district migration
Dependent Variable Coefficient N adj. R2
Minority vs Majority
Total migration rate -0.005 129 0.201
(0.107)
Rural male migration rate 0.011 129 0.197
(0.139)
Bordering Districts
Total migration rate -0.120 93 0.172
(0.159)
Rural male migration rate -0.212 93 0.225
(0.213)
Linguistic Distance
Total migration rate -0.427 51 0.597
(0.390)
Rural male migration rate -0.280 51 0.463
(0.559)
MinorityFraction
Total migration rate 0.042 129 0.204
(0.065)
Rural male migration rate 0.076 129 0.201
(0.085)
Notes: Regressions include decade fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Data sources: Census of India 1951-1991. Indian Meteorological Department,
and World Bank India Agriculture and Climate Data Set.
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